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The Catalan Revolution

When Lois and Charles Orr arrived in Barcelona in the last days of the summer of 1936, the city was showing all the signs of a most unusual development. The exterior of the cityscape was dominated by the banners, posters, parades and demonstrations of the revolutionary Left, especially the anarchists. In a remarkable process, in the space of two months the political and cultural ambience of Barcelona – a city which had always been in flux – had been profoundly transformed into a showcase of the libertarian anarchist collectivist spirit. The presence of the National Labor Confederation/Iberian Anarchist Federation (CNT/FAI), the most visible force amongst the anarchist Left, was impossible to miss.

CNT/FAI armbands were worn, and CNT/FAI signs and banners were painted or plastered on every available wall on buses, cars, and trains as well, usually courtesy of the painters’ syndicate. Anarchist headquarters on Via Layetana (later changed to Via Durruti) had a mural several stories high, and so did the telephone building. Hundreds of open-air rallies and demonstrations were held in the parks, and the Barcelona bullring was a favored place for big meetings of the two organisations.

What had happened to bring about this profound interior and exterior transformation of the Catalan port city on the Mediterranean?

The Second Republic (from April 1931 to July 1936)

Almost from its beginning, the short-lived Second Spanish Republic (1931–1939) was a hotbed of political activism and intrigue used and
abused by the entire spectrum of political opinion, from the far Left to
the far Right. The first major political and military altercation occurred
in October 1934, when a social-democratic-led armed rebellion broke
out to stave off a perceived threat from the radical Right. The armed
clashes were most pronounced in the mining region of Asturias, where
the anarchist CNT joined with social democracy in a militant, work-
ing class–based, united front. In Catalonia the revolt took on more the
character of a nationalist revolt. Both uprisings failed, yet the ensu-
ing repression only served further to fuel the pent-up aspirations of
the socialist, anarchist and nationalist ranks, paving the way for the
successful election of a Popular Front government in February 1936.

The election of a government supported by social democracy, com-
munism and the bourgeois Left opened the floodgates to rank-and-file
spontaneous initiative. Political prisoners were freed by the insurgent
masses; a strike wave broke out throughout the cities of Spain; and in
the countryside land occupations and the settling of old scores became
commonplace. If there ever was a case where class struggles in the most
basic sense of that term were not only advocated but practised on a daily
basis and in the most remote stretches of a country, this was true for
Spain in the 1930s. What perhaps most frightened the Spanish rural
and urban elite was the fact that they had lost the initiative. From
October 1934 to February 1936, in the bienio negro (dark two years),
landlords and the urban rich had been in the control seat of economic
and political violence. Now the tables were turned, and the urban and
rural poor responded in kind. But by July 1936 the stage was ready for a
counter-revolutionary coup to put an end to this experiment in creeping
social revolution.

On 17 July 1936 General Franco stepped in to stop the tide of ‘red
anarchy’. From a military aspect, his coup d’état was relatively well
organized and should have succeeded had the urban and rural poor fol-
lowed the advice of their Popular Front leaders. But what Franco had
not counted on was yet another, even more powerful, spontaneous self-
expression of the Spanish masses who refused to capitulate before the
apparent superior military might of the counter-revolutionary rebels.
Whereas the parties of the Popular Front counselled caution and strict
adherence to the rules of bourgeois parliamentary politics, strongly
urging trust in the supposedly democratic spirit of the various forces
of law and order, rank-and-file initiative resulted in the spontaneous
creation of armed workers’ militias, heroic and often poorly armed
assaults on strongholds of the putschists and a general flowering of self-
organization to crush the Francoist Right. In the end Franco’s forces, the
Movimiento, wound up initially controlling only Morocco, small parts of Andalusia and a stretch of territory in the north reaching from Navarre, a royalist stronghold, to Galicia, excluding most of Asturias and the Basque Country.

In effect, each time that the workers’ organisations allowed themselves to be paralyzed by their anxiety to respect Republican legality and each time that their leaders were satisfied with what was said by the officers, the latter prevailed. On the other hand, the Movimiento was repulsed whenever the workers had time to arm and whenever they set about the destruction of the Army as such, independently of their leaders’ positions or the attitudes of “legitimate” public authorities.6

A bloody civil war ensued, lasting almost three years.

As could be predicted, the partial victory of the (mostly) working-class Left only served further to heat up the social and political atmosphere throughout Republican Spain. With the notable exception of the Basque Country, spontaneous land occupations and urban expropriations became less the exception than the norm. Within Spain, Catalonia led the way in the largely unplanned fashioning of a post-capitalist society and culture – and within Catalonia, Barcelona. Yet neither Republican Spain nor Catalonia in particular were nominally governed by forces sanctioning this social revolutionary trend. In the year after July 1936 Republican Spain therefore witnessed a classic case of dual power, two models of political, economic and cultural paradigms vying for supremacy – only, in this instance, the process was forcefully co-determined by the exigencies of an anti-fascist civil war, fought jointly by both Republican camps against the conservative Right. It was a situation unlike any other in the history of revolutionary movements in the twentieth century.

Franco’s coup, masterminded from the Canary Islands, began in Melilla on North African soil on 17 July. On 18 July Franco’s forces controlled Spanish Morocco and spread to the mainland. Serious fighting did not break out in Barcelona before 19 July and lasted two days.7 When the dust settled on the barricades, the city was effectively controlled by the working-class Left. The Catalan Revolution, simultaneously the most profound and least recognized social revolution in modern history, had begun.8
The trend towards self-organization

The elementary process of social revolution took on many forms, though a common trait everywhere was the formation of organs of self-government by the forces of the working-class Left. In the words of Burnett Bolloten, the foremost American authority on the Spanish Civil War, 'The courts of law were supplanted by revolutionary tribunals, which dispensed justice in their own way. [...] The banks were raided and their safe deposit boxes emptied. Penitentiaries and jails were invaded, their records destroyed, their inmates liberated.' 11 'Motion-picture theaters and legitimate theaters, newspapers and printing shops, department stores and hotels, deluxe restaurants and bars were likewise sequestered or controlled, as were the headquarters of business and professional associations and thousands of dwellings owned by the upper classes.' 12 Most importantly, Bolloten contends that political and military power ‘was split into countless fragments and scattered in a thousand towns and villages among the revolutionary committees that had instituted control over post and telegraph offices, radio stations, and telephone exchanges, organized police squads and tribunals, highway and frontier patrols, transport and supply services, and created militia units for the battlefronts’. 13

Apart from the distant, national, Popular Front government initially headed by the liberal José Giral, for many months after 20 July political power in Barcelona was effectively contested by three competing authorities: the regional government, the Generalitat, controlled by the Catalan nationalist, bourgeois Left; the Antifascist Militia Committee, the central body representing the ubiquitous local revolutionary committees; and the grassroots revolutionary committees themselves, charged with various tasks depending on location and circumstance. In the first two and a half months of the Catalan Revolution, the Antifascist Militia Committee was far more powerful than the Generalitat, though neighbourhood revolutionary committees frequently acted in an uncoordinated and autonomous fashion, disregarding both the Generalitat and the Antifascist Militia Committee. 14

A central element of this trend towards workers’ control and self-management was the rush towards collectivizations. Esenwein and Shubert contend that, in all of Spain, 1 million urban and 750,000 agricultural collectives sprang up literally overnight, ‘although it was in Catalonia, the centre of Spain’s manufacturing industries, that industrial or urban collectivisations went the deepest’. 15 ‘The collectivisations, whether violently denounced by their adversaries, …in practice ignored...
for many years by the historical profession, or idealized by the majority of anarchist commentators, constituted a contradictory reality', frightening beyond measure the fragile forces of the Catalan bourgeoisie. According to one source, 50% of the Barcelonan bourgeoisie fled outright; 40% were ‘eliminated from the social sphere'; and only 10% remained at the site of production. Few enterprises escaped collectivization, although firms owned by foreign investors were subject to relatively mild forms of expropriation, experiencing variants of workers’ control rather than outright workers’ self-management. The working class appeared firmly in control of a major industrial zone in the Spanish state.

Collectivization was equally widespread in much of Republican Spain’s countryside. Indeed, it was in portions of the Catalan and Aragonese hinterland that the self-organization of social, political and cultural affairs was most fully developed, as the traditional authorities had literally disappeared, contrary to Barcelona, where, even in the summer of 1936, the bourgeois nationalist government never gave up its claim to represent the sole legitimate authority.

The third and perhaps most crucial area of social life where revolutionary committees held undisputed sway at least for some months was the military.

Because the [Republican] government lacked the necessary forces with which to combat the military insurrection, the weight of the struggle at the fronts fell upon the labor unions and proletarian parties that organised militia forces under commanders appointed or elected from amongst the most resolute and respected of their men. These militia units, or “columns,” as they were generally called, to which army officers were attached under the watchful eye of party or union representatives, were controlled exclusively by the organisation that had created them, the officers assigned by the war minister possessing little or no authority.

This description of the origins of the Spanish militias depicts the proletarian military forces as they existed throughout Spain in the aftermath of Franco’s mid-July coup. For several months, there was little that the central government could do to counteract this trend towards the self-organization of military forces in Republican Spain, powerfully undergirding the more general trend towards self-management in all walks of life.
Letters from Barcelona

The slow waning of the Catalan Revolution

Yet a number of countervailing influences were at work that, in the end, resulted in a gradual process of ‘normalization’ of the Spanish Republican military. Apart from the desire of more conservative forces for a return to ‘normalcy’, the militias suffered from a number of debilitating flaws. They generally distrusted professional advisors, despite the lack of trained officers within the militias’ ranks. Volunteer militia units frequently disintegrated under the onslaught of superior enemy firepower. There existed ‘no central general staff in the proper sense of that word’. And individual militia units frequently operated with minimal concern for other columns, even neighbouring ones, leading to tragic misunderstandings sapping militia morale. None of these drawbacks were necessarily inherent to a democratic system of military affairs, but, given that they occurred in the context of a vicious civil war, such flaws eventually permitted the advocates of a traditional, hierarchically organized military to regain the upper hand. It did not help matters that the primary source of arms for Republican Spain was the Soviet government, itself frontally opposed to any experience in self-management or workers’ control, be it in industry, agriculture or the military.

Much has been made of Soviet conservatism as a key reason for the eventual demise of the Spanish and Catalan Revolution. Far more important than the very real Soviet complicity were two key political developments taking place in the month of September 1936. On 4 September 1936, a new Popular Front government was announced. The previous cabinet, headed by Giral, was exclusively composed of Left bourgeois Republicans. The new government was headed by the Left-wing socialist Francisco Largo Caballero, and included radical and moderate socialists and communists side by side with the three remaining Republicans. In late September the Catalan President Lluís Companys announced a similar shake-up in the composition of the Generalitat. The new Catalan government included not only the Left bourgeois nationalists, but, for the first time, also members of the anarchist CNT, the communist Unified Socialist Party of Catalonia (PSUC) and the dissident communist Workers Party of Marxist Unification (POUM).

Both measures led to the incorporation of working-class forces into the structures of traditional governments. The Left wing of the social democratic Socialist Workers Party of Spain (PSOE), the CNT and POUM had hitherto been key supporters of the self-management
structures, the ubiquitous ‘revolutionary committees’, in Catalonia and throughout Spain. With their entry into traditional cabinet politics they immediately began to de-emphasize the necessity and utility of such alternative forms of government. On 30 September 1936 a series of decrees were passed ‘formally militarizing the militias’. More importantly perhaps, on 1 October 1936 the Catalan Antifascist Militia Committee dissolved itself, a move followed up on 9 October with a Generalitat decree, supported by CNT and POUM representatives, to liquidate all local revolutionary committees.

The general trend towards dissolution of elements of self-management in Spanish and Catalan society is perhaps best exemplified by a seemingly supportive decree issued by the Generalitat on 24 October 1936. On that date, the coalition cabinet announced a measure legalizing the collectivization of Catalan industry, but at a price. In a significant restrictive clause, only enterprises with more than 100 employees were to be covered by this decree, and, most crucially, the individual factories were to be strictly subsumed under the authority of a centralized planning and decision-making body. While it is clear that some form of supra-factory control would have been beneficial to the shaky health of the Catalan economy, the main gist of this decree was far less benevolent. According to Carlos Semprún-Maura, ‘the state took charge of the collectivisations primarily to reign them in but also, and above all else, to spread its own influence and control to the detriment of workers’ autonomy’.

October 1936, then, constitutes a decisive turning point towards the reflux of social revolution in Catalonia and Spain. Yet the passing of a decree does not always immediately translate into reality, particularly under circumstances of revolution and civil war. In effect, Spain, and Catalonia in particular saw many more months in which the spirit of self-management could be unmistakably felt. Resistance to ‘normalisation’ was widespread, both in the economic and in the military domains. Thus, when Lois Orr arrived in Barcelona, she stepped into the middle of a revolutionary situation that was only beginning to be curtailed by hostile forces as well as by the self-limiting strategy of CNT and POUM in upcoming months. Lois’ letters bear witness to the continued extraordinary presence of the revolutionary spirit in the streets and neighbourhoods of Barcelona for at least eight more months after September 1936. The Catalan Revolution did not end with the wave of dissolutions and decrees that spelled the nominal end of the period when ‘revolutionary committees’ held sway.
The Barcelona May Events

Lois Orr’s letters break off with the outbreak of openly counter-revolutionary terror in the streets of the very centre of revolutionary activities, the so-called ‘Barcelona May Events’. Lois and Charles were eyewitnesses to this remarkable episode as well as victims of the ensuing repression of the dissident communist Left. The May Events therefore constitute a real and symbolic end point to this narrative as they exemplify the definite conclusion of meaningful dual power in Catalonia and the final stage of Lois’ and Charles’ Catalan experience.

On the afternoon of 3 May 1937, the communist police commissioner, with probable backing by the Generalitat, sent a truckload of Assault Guards to retake the central telephone exchange in the Plaça de Catalunya, a centrally located and highly visible symbol of dual power in the very heart of Barcelona. The CNT had sequestered and administered the Telefónica ever since the July battles nearly one year earlier. Confronted by the sudden appearance of the forces of the state, the anarchists defended their building, solidarity strikes broke out throughout the city and barricades went up in and around Barcelona. The fighting raged for nearly three days, about 200–500 lives were lost, and the Generalitat in the end mediated a ceasefire, leaving the military stand-off inconclusive. Yet within very few days it became readily apparent that the May Events, for all practical purposes, spelled the end of the period of meaningful dual power in Barcelona and therefore in Spain.

The reason behind this was that the bloody fighting provoked a national governmental crisis as Largo Caballero decisively refused to support the Generalitat and to rein in the anarchists and POUM. Ever since 1933 Largo Caballero had been the figurehead of the radical Left-wing faction within Spanish social democracy. In the aftermath of the May Events, more conservative forces within his own party used this opportunity to join forces with the openly counter-revolutionary communists and the bourgeois Left to remove Largo from the posts of minister of war and prime minister, which he held simultaneously. On 17 May the moderate socialist Juan Negrín took over the premiership. From now on the various levels of official government in Catalonia and Spain exhibited few compunctions in the marginalization and repression of the revolutionary Left. As Lois’ and Charles’ experience proves, even the Stalinist secret police could now operate with virtual impunity throughout Spain. The Catalan Revolution had come to an end.
Political parties on the Barcelonan Left

The fall of Largo Caballero symbolized the relative decline of the Left-wing faction within the PSOE from the formerly dominant position it had occupied since 1933. For almost four years the violent social conflicts within Spanish society had catapulted Largo Caballero, in prior years a moderate force in Spanish socialist politics, to the position of charismatic spokesperson for the radical Left. While refusing to join the camp of Marxist revolutionaries, composed of members of the dissident communist and Left socialist splinter groups, Largo Caballero gave expression to the hopes of those disaffected and radicalized members of Spanish society who had not adopted anarchism as their preferred ideology. The PSOE’s Centrist wing included Indalecio Prieto as undisputed intellectual leader for much of the 1930s. Prieto was a principal architect of the Spanish Popular Front. By the late spring of 1937, however, much of the PSOE’s following had begun to move into the orbit of Spanish communism, the latter a distinctly moderate force in the Republican camp. Consequently, it only stood to reason that a colourless sympathizer of Soviet communism, Juan Negrín, took over from Largo Caballero in May 1937 – and not the more independent-minded, though equally moderate, Prieto.35

Spanish anarchism was solidly organized into the CNT, an anarcho-syndicalist trade-union-cum-political-party founded in 1910. By 1927 a clandestinely operating cadre organization, the FAI, began to operate as the virtual control centre behind the mass-based CNT, pushing the latter towards repeated attempts at localized military rebellions, refusing to permit CNT engagement in electoral politics and thus remaining in splendid isolation from other forces of the Left. By early 1936, after the bienio negro, CNT and FAI had grown sufficiently savvy indirectly to encourage anarchist voters to cast their ballots for the Popular Front. The CNT–FAI furthermore, as we have seen, proved itself pragmatic enough in the course of 1936 to join traditional coalition cabinets – first in Catalonia and then, in early November 1936, at the national level. Still, the forces of the CNT–FAI were by far the most powerful force on the revolutionary Left in Republican Spain, and it was largely due to CNT–FAI pressure that the Spanish and Catalan Revolutions managed to take hold and survive for almost one year, despite the best efforts of more moderate forces to roll back its gains.36

Within Catalonia, the dissident communist POUM was the sole other numerically at least somewhat significant portion of the revolutionary Left. Founded in September 1935, most of its members came
from the Catalonia-based Workers’ and Peasants’ Bloc (BOC), originally a constituent part of the Right Opposition within the Communist International. The second, numerically insignificant but theoretically astute component part of the POUM originated in the Left Opposition within the Communist International. The POUM was highly critical of the relatively moderate Popular Front, but joined in its electoral association in February 1936 in order to retain a link with the masses. For similar reasons, the POUM agreed to join the Generalitat in late September 1936. The POUM incorporated the spirit of workers’ control and self-management no less than the CNT-FAI, and it became the central target for repression after the Barcelona May Events. Charles Orr became a member of the POUM; Lois stood close to the Trotskyist tendency within and outside the POUM.37

The Moscow-oriented Spanish Communist Party (PCE) was a marginal force in Spanish politics till 1936. A strong advocate of a Popular Front since the late spring of 1935, towards the end of 1935, in part by dint of the existence of the Soviet example as an alternative to the crisis of capitalism in the 1930s, the PCE had acquired sufficient prestige to exert significant intellectual influence over important elements within the social democratic leadership and ranks. A first organizational success could be recorded in April 1936 when the social democratic youth organization merged with the communist youth group. Within days of Franco’s coup, the Catalan branch of the PSOE, together with small splinter groups, likewise carried out a merger with the Catalan branch of the PCE to form the PSUC. Always under strict Soviet control, the PCE and PSUC became the most forceful advocates of moderation in the Republican camp.38

Catalan nationalism

Catalonia’s rise to prominence as an economic, political and linguistic entity can be traced back to the rise of a Catalan commercial empire in the High to Late Middle Ages. In the eyes of Pierre Vilar, the foremost historian of Catalonia, ‘thirteenth- and fourteenth century Catalonia [was] the most precocious nation-state of Europe: language, territory, economic life, political institutions, and cultural community were present at this early date’.39 By the fifteenth century, however, the Castilian court was beginning to encroach on Catalan autonomy, which was formally abolished in 1716. By various direct and indirect means the central government promoted Castilian over the Catalan vernacular, though Catalan remained the language of ordinary communication
throughout the modern age. Meaningful autonomy, however, did not re-emerge until the advent of the Second Republic. By 1932 an official statute of autonomy was issued to Catalonia and, throughout the lifespan of the Republic, the Left bourgeois *Esquerra Republicana* was the dominant political force of Catalan nationalism in the Catalan government, the Generalitat. Though nominally in power till the end of the civil war, the Generalitat fell victim to the consequences of the May Events as well. In effect, the national government used the excuse of the Barcelonan fighting to revoke the Generalitat’s authority over the Catalan army and police forces, thus terminating the brief experiment in meaningful Catalan autonomy. Catalan autonomy in the interwar years thus rose and fell with the forceful emergence and eventual decline of social conflicts in Catalan and Spanish civil society. This, however, did not mean, as Lois’ letters show, that social revolutionaries and Catalan nationalists operated in complementary fashion or even understood each other. Still, a strong populist streak in *Esquerra* nationalism permitted, for the most part, a relatively peaceful coexistence with the social revolutionary anarchist camp, unless the latter resorted to arms.

**Foreign revolutionaries in Barcelona**

By the summer of 1936, most European countries had abandoned the path of political democracy. With the notable exception of Czechoslovakia, by the mid-1930s most Eastern, Central and Southern European states had adopted one of several forms of political dictatorship. One of the consequences of these developments in the political sphere was a flood of refugees across the continent, most of them political activists trying to escape persecution, imprisonment, torture and the possibility of death. Yet for such exiles, the menu of available political safe havens narrowed as the decade progressed. It did not help matters that many refugees were located somewhere on the political far Left.

Therefore, when the Spanish Revolution erupted in the summer of 1936, Spain immediately became a beacon of hope. Spain incorporated simultaneously the possibility that the drift towards dictatorships could be stopped and that social revolution was a practical option. Within Spain, Catalonia saw the most concentrated expression of these hopes – and within Catalonia, Barcelona. For roughly ten months after July 1936, the Catalan port city on the Mediterranean became – for antifascists! – the freest city in the world. Local politics being dominated by anarcho-syndicalists, virtually every possible tendency or fraction of
the anarchist, Marxist and libertarian Left made its presence felt. While Catalan activists served as the backbone of this experiment in proletarian democracy, foreign sympathizers added their own peculiar and particular touches to this kaleidoscope of political views and philosophies of life. Barcelona became a magnet for foreign revolutionaries. Some considered Barcelona merely a stopover on their frequently torturous journey to join the International Brigades. Of those who stayed, many came to test out their political theories; most came because they sensed a home away from home; virtually all of them flocked to Barcelona because they sensed a strong affinity for the free-wheeling political atmosphere prevailing along the main boulevards of downtown Barcelona, the Ramblas. With few exceptions, they came to help the process of social revolution – though few agreed on what this process really meant.41

Lois and Charles Orr fit in exceedingly well into this cauldron of radical political beliefs. Though relatively safe because of their American citizenship, enabling them to return to their home country at will, a privilege beyond the reach of most foreign revolutionaries in their circle of friends, they shared most trials and tribulations of these foreign comrades, including their eventual imprisonment in a communist prison. The intervention by the American Consul General appears to have been decisive in securing Lois’ and Charles’ ultimate release. In that not unimportant sense, but in that sense only, the story of Lois Orr differs from that of most other foreigners in Barcelona. In virtually all other respects, her personal and political itinerary may stand for that of many of her friends and comrades.

Notes


6. The political and social background to the genesis of a Popular Front is masterfully demonstrated for Catalonia by Ricard Vinyes i Ribes, *La Catalunya internacional* (Barcelona: Curial, 1983).


10. The first scholar to have drawn attention to this peculiar historiographical fate of the Catalan Revolution was Noam Chomsky in a 1967 article which has recently been reissued as a monograph, *Objectivity and Liberal Scholarship* (New York: Free Press, 2003). Emphasizing the vanguard role of Catalonia, George Esenwein and Adrian Shubert more recently also pointed to the internationally unique role of the Catalan and, more generally, the Spanish Revolution: 'When compared to the Russian example, it is patent that in Spain the degree of workers' control was far more penetrating and of greater magnitude'; see their *Spain at War*, p. 134. Perhaps the most thorough depiction of Catalan political culture under the Second Republic as a whole is Enric Ucelay da Cal, *La Catalunya populista: Imatge, cultura i política en l'etapa republicana (1931–1939)* (Barcelona: La Magrana, 1982).


13. Ibid., p. 53.


18. See Bernecker, *Anarchismus und Bürgerkrieg*, pp. 146–147, for the Catalan revolutionaryaries’ relatively cautious treatment of foreign investments. A useful five-point typology of collectivizations, ranging from control via nationalization (primarily of war industries) to outright collective ownership, can be gauged in Bernecker, *Anarchismus und Bürgerkrieg*, p. 207. For the most convincing overall view of the collectivization process in Catalonia as a whole, see Antoni Castells i Duran, *Desarrollo y significado del proceso estatizador en la experiencia colectivista catalana (1936–1939)* (Madrid: Nossa y Jara, 1996). An earlier detailed overall description and analysis of the Catalan political economy in the years of the civil war is Josep Maria Bricall, *Política Econòmica de la Generalitat (1936–1939)*, 2 vols (Barcelona: Edicions 62, 1978). A memoir by a former anarchist and administrator within the Generalitat’s Department of Labor in the years under consideration – Albert...


20. On the comparatively unfettered presence of ‘direct democracy’ in rural Catalonia and Aragon, see Semprún-Maura, *Revolución*, p. 179, and the studies mentioned in the preceding note.


22. For surveys of the role and function of militias on the Republican side in the Spanish Civil War, see Bolloten, *Spanish Civil War*, pp. 249–265, and Michael Alpert, *El ejército republicano en la guerra civil* (Paris: Ruedé ibérico, 1977), pp. 37–70. Local studies of revolutionary militias include Piqué i Padró, *Tarragona*, pp. 81–107. I cannot address more than in passing the role of the International Brigades, the close to 60,000 international volunteers for the military defence of the Spanish Republic who found their way to Spain at various times and often under the most harrowing circumstances, frequently experiencing the revolutionary atmosphere in Barcelona on their way to their deployment at various fronts. In this context it is, however, worth highlighting the source of the very first foreign volunteers to join the Spanish militias after 17 July, when some of the athletes who had arrived in Barcelona from more than 20 countries to participate in the Popular Olympiad, set up to protest the holding of the official 1936 Olympics in Nazi Germany, opted for military engagement instead of demonstrating their athletic skills. The *Olimpíada Popular* had been scheduled to be held in Barcelona from 22 to 26 July 1936. On this counter-Olympiad of Barcelona, which was ultimately pre-empted by Franco’s coup, see Carles Santacana and Xavier Pujadas, *L’altra Olimpíada: Barcelona’36* (Barcelona: Llibres de l’Index, 2006 [1990]).

23. The development of the Republican military units, featuring the gradual absorption of ‘irregular’ militias into the far more traditional command
structures of the rapidly developing Republican forces, can be studied, from varying perspectives, in Bolloten, Spanish Civil War, particularly pp. 249–279, citation on p. 258; Graham, Republic at War, pp. 131–214; and Semprún-Maura, Revolución, pp. 187–236.


25. The respective cabinet compositions are listed in Bolloten, Spanish Civil War, pp. 46–47, 118.

26. The new cabinet composition of the Generalitat can be studied in Bolloten, Spanish Civil War, pp. 402–403. Broué and Témime, Revolution and Civil War, p. 202, give 26 September as the date when the new cabinet was announced; Semprún-Maura, Revolución, p. 195, points out 27 September as the date; and Bolloten, Spanish Civil War, p. 402, suggests 28 September, as does Graham, Republic at War, p. 229. I will survey the party political spectrum in a separate section later in this chapter.

27. On the machinations behind this new ‘Popular Army’, see Bolloten, Spanish Civil War, pp. 272–279. The citation is taken from Graham, Republic at War, p. 148.

28. On these decisive steps in Catalonia, see Broué and Témime, Revolution and Civil War, p. 204. Semprún-Maura dates the Antifascist Militia Committee’s autodissolution to 3 October; see his Revolución, p. 195. Helen Graham rightfully points to the close connection between the CNT’s agreement to dissolve the Antifascist Militia Committee and the CNT’s entry into the Generalitat; see Graham, Republic at War, p. 227.

29. See especially Bernecker, Anarchismus und Bürgerkrieg, pp. 175–188, for a detailed analysis of the collectivization decree of 24 October 1936.


32. The literature on the May Events is plentiful and extremely partisan. The most famous literary rendition of this episode is George Orwell, Homage to Catalonia (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1952), pp. 121–179. Orwell fought in the ranks of the POUM militias on the Aragonese front and happened to be on leave in Barcelona when the May Events erupted. For a recent and likewise well-balanced English-language summary, see Esenwein and Shubert, Spain at War, pp. 220–224. See also Frank Mintz and Miguel Pecina, Los Amigos de Durruti, los trotskistas y los sucesos de Mayo (Madrid: Campo Abierto, 1978). Most recently, on the occasion of the seventieth ‘anniversary’ of the Barcelona May Days, two new publications have updated the story behind the event from differing perspectives: Ferran Gallego, Barcelona,
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33. The end of dual power was accompanied by severe repression of the revolutionary forces in all of Spain. For Catalonia, the discussion and the detailed listings of Josep M. Solé i Sabaté and Joan Villarroya i Font, La repressió a la rearguarda de Catalunya (1936–1939), 2 vols (Barcelona: Publicacions de l’Abadia de Montserrat, 1989/1990), accounting for victims of all factions on the Republican side for the entire duration of the civil war, are a good place to start. For the specific repression of revolutionary factions in Tarragona, see Piqué i Padró, Tarragona, pp. 193–222. The chapter on repression in Manuel Gimeno, Revolució, guerra i represió al Pallars (1936–1939) (Barcelona: Publicacions de l’Abadia de Montserrat, 1989), pp. 54–90, covers all types of repression, but including the reverberations of the fets de maig. The May Events and their repercussion in Tortosa and Lleida are covered in Pujadas i Martí, Tortosa, pp. 197–212, and Sagüés San José, Lleida, pp. 130–151.

34. See Bolloten, Spanish Civil War, pp. 462–473, for a detailed narrative of the fall of Largo Caballero from power.


36. The literature on Spanish anarchism in the 1930s is no longer just the exclusive domain of former CNT activists. Perhaps the most solid overall survey of Spanish anarchosyndicalism in this turbulent decade was, for a long time, John Brademas’s slightly reworked 1953 dissertation, Anarcosindicalismo y revolución en España (1930–1937) (Esplugues de Llobregat: Ariel, 1974). But see now, above all else, Julián Casanova, Anarchism, the Republic and the Spanish Civil War, 1931–1939 (London: Routledge, 2005), and Heleno Saña, Die libertäre Revolution: Die Anarchisten im spanischen Bürgerkrieg (Hamburg: Nautius, 2001). Amongst the plethora of anarchist reminiscences, see most notably José Peirats, La CNT en la revolución española, 3 vols (Paris: Ruede Ibérico, 1971), now available in English as The CNT in the Spanish Revolution, 3 vols (Hastings: Christie Books, 2001–2005).


38. By far the outstanding work on Second Republic Spanish communism is Rafael Cruz, El Partido Comunista de España en la II República (Madrid: Alianza, 1987). On the PSUC, see Josep Lluís Martín i Ramos, Els orígens del Partit Socialista Unificat de Catalunya (1930–1936) (Barcelona: Curial, 1977). On Spanish socialist/communist youth politics in the 1930s, see Ramón Casterás


41. On the end of Catalan autonomy in 1937, see Esenwein and Shubert, Spain at War, p. 224.

42. On this continental tilt towards dictatorships, see Horn, European Socialists, pp. 5–6.

43. On the presence of these foreign revolutionaries in Barcelona, see my ‘The Language of Symbols and the Barriers of Language: Foreigners’ Perceptions of Social Revolution (Barcelona 1936–1937)’, History Workshop Journal, 29 (Spring 1990), 42–64, reprinted in this book as Chapter 3. There exists, of course, a plethora of memoirs of varying quality on this phenomenon of ‘revolutionary tourism’ in Barcelona. On some of the attendant socio-psychological consequences of these foreign revolutionaries’ projection of their desire for social revolution, often by then decisively crushed in their native lands, onto Catalonian and Spanish politics, see Gerd-Rainer Horn, ‘Mentalität und Revolution. Lebensbedingungen und Realitätsskonstruktionen ausländischer Sympathisanten der katalanischen Revolution’, in Andreas Graf (ed.), Anarchisten gegen Hitler: Anarchisten, Anarcho-Syndikalisten, Rätekommunisten in Widerstand und Exil (Berlin: Lukas, 2001), pp. 156–188.
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Table of contents. Acknowledgments. List of tables. List of illustrations. Summary. Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION. (No subdivisions were given in this chapter.) Statement of the Problem. 

viii. SUMMARY. The term "Brillouin scattering" refers to the quasi-elastic scattering of electromagnetic radiation which involves a normal frequency change of a fraction of a wave number for visible light.

INTRODUCTION. Light scattering has been developed as one of the most useful techniques in physical chemistry. It is commonly used for determining the molecular weights of macromolecules in solutions. Acknowledge, acknowledgment, or acknowledgement may refer to: Acknowledgment (creative arts and sciences), a statement of gratitude for assistance in producing a work. Acknowledgment index, a method for indexing and analyzing acknowledgments in the scientific literature. "Acknowledgement" (song), a 1965 song from John Coltrane's album A Love Supreme. Acknowledgement (data networks), a signal used to indicate acknowledgement. viii. List of Figures. Fig. 1.1. Axial cryosection images depicting internal structures within a) the head and b) the abdomen of the Female model from the U.S. National Library of Medicine. Fig. 2.7. Illustration of three-dimensional surface mesh generation for a pelvic bone from the stack of images for Visible Human (VHP) Project using MATLAB tools. Only a part of the original point cloud, which is the starting point of mesh generation, is shown in Fig. A. Introduction and Review of the Prior Work. Importance of computational human-body models. Computational modeling offers tremendous insight into a wide range of bioelectrical and biomechanical problems with improved tools for the design of medical devices and the diagnosis of pathologies. 

List of Symbols. 1 Introduction. 2 Background. 3 Electromagnetic Metamaterials. Acknowledgements. This project was partially funded by the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada (NSERC) through the Postgraduate Scholarship program. Funding was also provided by the Informatics Circle of Research Excellence (iCORE), and its successor Alberta Innovates Technology Futures (AITF). viii. Citations to Previously Published Work. Two of the chapters contained herein are largely reproduced from my work that has been published previously.